The generation of American international lawyers who founded the American Society of International Law in 1906 and nurtured the soil for what has been retrospectively called a 'moralistic-legalistic approach to international relations' remains little studied. A survey of the rise of international legal literature in the United States from the midnineteenth century to the eve of the Great War serves as a backdrop to the examination of the boosting effect on international law of the Spanish American War in 1898. An examination of the Insular Cases before the US Supreme Court is then accompanied by the analysis of a number of influential factors behind the pre-war rise of international law in the United States. The work concludes with an examination of the rise of natural law doctrines in international law during the interwar period and the critiques addressed by the realist founders of the field of 'international relations' to the 'moralistic-legalistic approach to international relations'.
Introduction
International lawyers have made much of certain dates and some international lawyers have made much of highlighting that such was indeed the case. 1 The year 1919 exemplifies this phenomenon where the elevation of a certain date as well as a reflective examination and, often, dispute of the symbolism that it has acquired for international law as a field of intellectual inquiry appear united. There is no lack of arguments for such a fixation with great dates of international law as the emblematic porticos for specific periods in the history of international law or, by the same token, for the reflective critical examination and the accompanying disputatio of their acquired symbolism in standard periodisations of the field. 2 The great epochal date often acts as a shortcut to evoke an event which was deemed so fundamental in the reconstruction of the memory of international law to itself so as to be able inaugurate a new stage in a long narrative of intra-disciplinary progress. 3 Peace treaties, in particular, have spawned an extensive international legal-historical literature around them. 4 Their presence is, indeed, a recurrent one within the category of what M. Koskenniemi has termed 'stereotypical contextbreaking events'. 5 These are regularly found as symbolic turning points in the classic periodisation of the history of international law. 6 The year 1648, the date of the Peace of Westphalia that put an end to the Thirty Years' War, stands, perhaps, as the most representative illustration of what S. Beaulac has termed an aetiological myth 7 in international law on account of the seminal quality acquired by the date of 1648 as the European geopolitical origin for a modern (or classical) law of nations circumscribed in its application to the rights and duties of the sovereign states in their external relations. The year 1919, the date of the Treaty of Versailles, 8 also belongs within this category of great momentous 'stereotypical context-breaking events' in the history of international law. Sharing the aetiological myth-quality within the discipline of 1648, the year 1919 has also been characterised as the great portico for the 'foundational period of contemporary international law'. 9 This is specially so because, Versailles, with its partial 'return to a concept of just peace' 10 on account of the punishing measures which were imposed upon Germany, and the establishment, in its wake, of the League of Nations which included an innovative 'mandate system', 11 often overlaps in the memory of the discipline with the establishment of the first universal international institutions of permanent character in the supranational sphere. The year 1919 opened, indeed, the way for an interwar period which, a century after the beginning of 'the Great War' that prompted 'the move to institutions', 12 maintains its contemporary relevance for our own day and age where the proliferating institutionalisation and juridification of the supranational sphere occupies most of the international legal scholars' works and reflections. 13 The move to international institutions in the aftermath of the First World War was, needless to say, the offspring of uncountable events as well as of a myriad of economic, political, social as well as legal and philosophical genealogies. 14 Woodrow Wilson is yet, perhaps, one of the figures the public at large -including noninternational lawyers -would most immediately associate with the Treaty of Versailles and the foundation of the League of Nations. Indeed, uncountable volumes have been penned on Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech 15 and on his personal commitment to the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Versailles Conference. Wilson's ultimate failure to persuade the US Congress to join the League of Nations has also been abundantly documented. 16 Moreover, the symbolic role of Wilsonianism in the genealogy of liberal internationalism and idealism in international relations as well as its critical examination in the context of American foreign policy remains up to this day a matrix for multiple analysis, reflections and voluminous studies. 17 Yet for all of Wilson's conspicuous championing of the cause of international law and international institutions since 1917, the fact remains that an excessive focus on the main actors of stereotypical context-breaking events in international law -a focus which, moreover, has often adopted a de-historicised normative perspective in the works penned by international lawyerstends to cast to the margins of such an intra-disciplinary history the study of a number of other factors which often nurtured the soil for the international legal views, positions and actions of their protagonists. Therefore, to construct new alternative narratives, which identify and highlight alternative events in the chronology of international law, may help provide a new breadth and texture to the historical background of the great historical caesurae predominant in today's standard chronologies and periodisations of the history of international law. Experimenting with alternative approaches also contributes to a post-Cold War 'turn to history in international law' which, for the last 15 years, has profoundly enriched and deepened a new generation of international legal scholars' reflective understanding of the complex historical layers and multilayered intellectual sour- ted States during its war with Spain in 1898' to which, according to Boyle, 'the birth of both the ASIL and its journal can be attributed to'. 24 A review of the political facet of the imperialist/anti-imperialist divide that followed the Spanish American War in 1898 shall, then, lead to a brief examination of the Insular Cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States between 1901and1904. Furthermore, a review of the influence of the religious-inspired peace movement's support for the juridification of international disputes and a brief survey of the evolution of international legal literature in the United States from the mid to the late nineteenth century will help situate the foundation of the American Society of International Law against the background of the intellectual tradition against which it emerged. After a brief examination of the context of the foundation of ASIL, including by reference to the role in its foundation of the rise of prestige of the field of international arbitration during the nineteenth century, abridged consideration is given to two features of the American civiclegal culture. It will be, indeed, shown that the civic identity-building role of law and the importance of public opinion in the United States were, along with the peace movement, influential factors behind the orientation of this pre-First World War generation of American international lawyers. Moreover, a reference to the early efforts of the American Society of International Law to spur the study of international law in American law schools during the early 1900s is illustrated by a little-known bibliographical episode that took place at Harvard Law School. This historical episode evidences not only the rising prestige of international law immediately before the First World War in the United States, it also exemplifies how the Spanish American War affected the cultivation of international law in exactly opposite ways in the United States and Spain as the dawn of the 'American Century' coincided with the sunset of the first empire in history in which the sun never set. Finally, the conclusion reflects on the influence of the moralistic-legalistic approach to international relations during the interwar years in particular in connection to the resurgence of natural law doctrines during this period. The conclusion also touches upon the incisive critique to which this legalistic-moralistic approach was made the object by the founding fathers of the field of 'international relations' during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. what has come to be known as the Insular Cases, 37 was confronted to the legal question of whether the US Constitution should 'follow the flag'. The answer to this question, which was triggered by the much narrower question to know whether the Congress could impose a tariff on the commerce between the mainland and the former Spanish colonial islands, was intrinsically connected with the way in which the US constitutional doctrine had developed to respond to the aggrandizement of the US territory during the nineteenth century. Given the silence of the Constitution on the matter, debates between Federalists against the Jeffersonian support for the application of the implied powers doctrine had traditionally revolved, around the 'congressional interpretation of the power of Congress with respect to territories'. 38 A series of nineteenth century cases, including those dealing with the annexation by treaty of Louisiana (1803) and Florida (1819) or the annexation by joint resolution of Texas, had resulted in an amalgam of determined and undetermined issues concerning territoriality. These issues, including custom tariff matters, arose again in a new light in 1901. More importantly still, the Insular Cases offered the Court its first opportunity to examine fundamental questions regarding the Constitution's 'geographic scope'. While until then, for the Supreme Court there had been 'little need to explore the outer boundaries of the Constitution's geographic reach', 39 the Congress' decision to discontinue its previous practice of extending constitutional rights to the new territories by statute confronted the Supreme Court now for the first time with the question to know 'whether the Constitution, by its own force, applies in any territory that is not a state'. 40 The final 'doctrine of territorial incorporation' inaugurated in the Insular Cases differentiated between the application of the Constitution to incorporated territories destined for statehood -where it applies in full -and to unincorporated territories -where it only applies in part. 41 The Insular Cases became, by this token, a step in the chain of what would later become a 'functional approach' to 'the selective application of constitutional limitations to the U.S. government outside its sovereign territory'. 42 At the time, however, the issue of the Constitution's extraterritorial application fitted within a U.S.'rationalization of colonialism as being a first step -in what was going, nonetheless, to prove itself a very long road -towards self-government, 43 thus accounting for the transposition of the legal-colonial scaffolding of the British Empire's model of 'parliamentary imperial sovereignty' 44 to the Philippines which would only become a fully independent state in 1946 while the legal status of Guam and Puerto Rico is that of 'an unincorporated territory of the United States' 45 up to this day. Although the rise of international law in the United States after the Spanish American War of 1898 took place against the background of a nineteenth century long period of territorial expansion at the expense of Native Americans and did clearly benefit from the dawn of a new corporate commercial US imperialism and from a series of geostrategic colonial considerations which I have introductorily surveyed, a distorted historical image would emerge should the pre-Wilsonian rise of international law in the United States become detached from a brief account of a number of other concomitant factors. Among the latter ranks, firstly, the fact that the US literature on international law was gaining momentum at the turn of the twentieth century. 46 This development relied on a long evolution of the history of international law in the United States which is often traced back to the publication in 1836 of Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law. This was the first book in English language to wear which was by then the still relatively recent neologism that had been coined by Jeremy Bentham 47 in 1789. In the wake of the independence of the American republics from Spain, 48 the university teaching of international law also emerged comparatively earlier in the United States than -some exceptions notwithstanding 49 the United States were taught in 1846 at Yale by Theodore D. Woolsey, who would also go on to publish in 1860 his 'Introduction to the Study of International Law', 50 the earliest textbook by an US author. 51 During the American Civil War, Harvard Law School (in 1863) and Columbia Law School (in 1865), under the magisterium of Francis Lieber, had already followed suit by offering courses on international law. From the antebellum period dates, however, the influential drive of the tradition of the American Christian peace movement for the establishment of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. By then, Benthamite ideals 52 in line with the enlightened idealism of Abbé de Saint-Pierre, J.J. Rousseau and I. Kant appear ingrained in the 'pacifist' religious imagination of a series of early supporters of the international court movement in the United States. The importance of their precursor role on the path that would eventually lead, in the aftermath of the First World War, to the first attempt of transposition with permanent character to the international plane of the institutions that are more readily associated with the rule of law and the doctrine of separation of powers in domestic settings has been highlighted by a number of authors. 53 According, for instance, to M Janis, the US Christian peace movement was rooted in the pacifist testimony of the Quakers 54 ic international legal ideas. This development has been aided by the rise of the 'scientific' method 84 across the social sciences in the nineteenth century. As it happened in other fields of social sciences, the rise of the scientific legal method jumped on the bandwagon of the development that, since the mid-nineteenth century, natural sciences had been experiencing. This was the period of industrial revolution and breakthroughs in physics, biology, medicine, zoology and technical-applied sciences in transport and communications. The prestige of 'science' also contributed decisively to the rise of positivism in international law 85 through the importation of burnished categorical modes of thought to bear scientifically against the influential 'Austinian challenge' that, since early in the nineteenth century, had influentially presented international law as 'positive international morality'. 86 Classificatory schemes were designed to be set against the disorder of international relations in order to identify the actual behavior of sovereign states and the actual laws that those states created through their conduct. In the wake of the spread of codification, 'this scientific methodology favored, then a movement toward abstraction -a propensity to rely upon a formulation of categories and their systematic exposition as a means of preserving order and arriving at the correct solution to any particular problem.' 87 The scientific approach was increasingly seen as a precondition for the manageable progressive development of international law. The spirit of the progressive view channeled through positivism is captured by Lassa Oppenheim, the author of the most influential treatise in the English language of the early twentieth century, 88 writing in the by then just barely launched American Journal of International Law (AJIL) in 1908 'for the knowledge of realities enables the construction of realizable truths, in contradistinction to hopeless dreams' . 89 The aspirational equation of peace-and-justice with the scientific international law embodied by the legaluniversalist high-mindedness of the new organisation would, however, soon be combined with a strict 'Americanness' in the works of the organisation. Although the founders of ASIL were, as we have seen, the intellectual inheritors of a nineteenth century peripheral idealistic tradition, they were also the elite members of a rising semi-peripheral Western country which after having extended and consolidated its own domestic frontiers through continental expansion largely at the expense of American indigenous peoples during the nineteenth century, had just, experienced its own transition into an imperial power with overseas territories. 90 The early influence of the rise to a foreign policy generation of 'lawyers qua lawyers' who reached the apex of their influence in shaping US foreign policy during the Progressive Era (1890s to 1920s) law', as a 'law of coordination', presided over by E. Kaufman's principle of ' nur, der, der kann, darf auch', 95 as a product, in Jellinek's description, of the state's 'selfcommitment or self-limitation' 96 or else, as conceptualised by Heinrich Triepel, as a common will resulting from normative agreements (Vereinbarung) 97 in which the domestic and international legal orders remained separated as two distinct different legal systems. 98 Despite the dominance of dualist approaches on the international legal theoretical front, this period also witnessed the emergence of some positivist monist theories of international which accorded, none the less, the normative supremacy to municipal law over international law, as well as the experimentation with the refashioning of dualist theories, prominent among which was Dionisio Anzilotti's normativist approach 99 that fixed pacta sunt servanda as an a priori assumption in order to surpass strict voluntarism. The nationalist bias in the development of international law earlier on channeled by ASIL did, however, not interfere, with the fact that one of the main focuses of development of the earlier ASIL's works was the devising of peaceful means of international dispute settlement. These goals included, as noted by Boyle, 'the creation of a general system for the obligatory arbitration of disputes between states (…) the establishment of an International Court of Justice (…) and the codification of important areas of customary international law into positive treaty law'. 100 It is because of their championing of this scientific development of peaceful international legal mechanisms that this pre-Wilsonian generation has been characterised as belonging to the 'moralisticlegalistic approach to international relations' which is a term originally used by realist scholars in the aftermath of the Second World War to characterise the approach to international relations adopted by the interwar generation of international lawyers. Two characteristic features of the American culture in the twentieth century also helped to foster the establishment of the American Society of International Law and to shape the approach of the pre-Wilsonian generation of international lawyers. The first of them is the US domestic culture of legalistic rule. The second one is the early Twentieth Century's liberal hope on the beneficial effects of an informed and educated public opinion over the shaping of law and public policy. This hope in the beneficial effects that an informed public opinion might have on the conduct of foreign policy served as a rationale for a strong campaigning in favour of the bolstering of the teaching and study of international law in the US law schools. This initiative was early on channeled through the recently constituted ASIL. First, the first characteristic feature which influenced the pre-Wilsonian generation of international lawyers was US domestic culture of legalistic rule. According, indeed, to the classic theorist of British constitutionalism, A.V. Dicey's writing in the early 1910s, 'the main reason why the U.S. has carried out the federal system with unequalled success is that the people of the Union are more thoroughly imbued with legal ideas that any other existing nation'. 101 This culture of legalistic rule, captured in the conspicuous non sub homine sed sub deo et lege, and the related predominant role that lawyers played in the US domestic realm and in shaping public opinion and ideas on national policy would be transposed to the framework of international affairs through a new generation of 'lawyers qua lawyers'. The projection of the creed that America was a government of laws, not of men 102 would become a blank check for a generation of lawyers who became the new elite intelligentsia entrusted with governing the international realm. The result of balancing the anti-colonial spirit of the Declaration of Independence with the domestic cultural legalist approach was that the American imperial project soon found itself wrapped in a legalist approach to international relations that would culminate in the Wilsonian promotion of international law and the development of international organisations for the rest of the world. The second feature of the American culture that influenced the emergence of the legalist approach to international relations among the elite intelligentsia at the turn of the twentieth century was the confidence in the positive role of public opinion which was held to be particularly strong in its effects on the American political landscape. According to another external observer of the United States in this epoch, J. Bryce -Regius Professor at Oxford and highly influential British Ambassador to the United States (1907-1913) -echoing a liberal disposition also prevalent in the United Kingdom at the time, which stressed the positive effects of an informed democratic public opinion in fostering progress in public policy and law, 103 in 'no country is public opinion so powerful as in the United States'. 104 'Towering over presidents and state legislatures, over conventions, and the vast machinery of party, public opinion stands out, in the United States, as the great source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it', 105 the almost colossal quality that Bryce attributes to public opinion in the United States finds an echo in the first ever arti- 
The Insular Cases is a denomination which is
The increase of popular control over national conduct, which marks the political development of our time, makes it constantly more important that the great body of the people in each country should have a just conception of their international rights and duties. (…). Of course it is not to be expected that the whole body of any people will study international law; but a sufficient number can readily become sufficiently familiar with it to lead and form public opinion in every community in our country upon all important international questions as they arise. 106 The goal of reaching out to the lay person in order to plant the seeds for the dissemination in the popular conscience of the need to abide by international legal principles in the ordered management of the state's foreign relations was one of the rhetorical factors that led to an early campaigning in favour of the bolstering of the teaching and study of international law. Indeed, among the declared goals of the ASIL was that of stimulating interest in international law studies among representatives of US Law Schools. This is the goal that was further spurred by J.B. Scott's position as the Director of the International Law Division of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. J. Brown Scott, the ultimate hero of the foundation of the American Society of International Law, was portrayed by the ASIL's journey-co-traveler as 'our mentor, our engineer, our constant supporter from the beginning'. 107 Praise, bordering on eulogy, is a recurrent trait in almost any portrayal that his coetaneous offered of the J.B. Scott who was also nominated six times for the Nobel Peace Prize and became the recipient of seventeen honorary degrees, including one by Salamanca University where Francisco de Vitoria had been Prima Professor of Sacred Theology four centuries earlier. Indeed, other than being the first Editor-inChief of the American Journal of International Law between 1907 and 1924, and a constant contributor to his pages, this so portrayed as 'behind the scenes leader' 108 of the American academia of international law during the first third of the twentieth century, was also a powerful engine behind the establishment of international law in American law schools. This educational drive was consistent with Brown Scott's creed that the path to peace was a 'process of education, not a process of treaty making and treaty breaking (…) winning over one generation, winning over other generation, until justice shall be the great interest of the world'. 109 Yet despite J.B. Scott's extensive campaigning and activist role for the internationali-sation of legal education both domestically and abroad, international law in American law schools remained almost marginal in the first half of the twentieth century. The first endowed chair of international law at Harvard Law -the Bemis professorship in international law -had been established in 1898 and, by 1907, only ten law schools in the United States offered international law. 110 This status quo was not greatly affected by the holding of the First Conference of Teachers of International Law (1914) organised by the ASIL. The ASIL 'earnestly requests all law schools which now offer no instruction in international law to add to their curriculum a thorough course in that subject' or the ASIL's other calls which 'urged the American Bar Association to take action towards the inclusion of international law among law school subjects and those required for admission to the bar'. 111 Moreover, it should be noted that J.B. Scott allied his institutional efforts to bolster the teaching of international law in the first half of the twentieth century with the spreading of a particular type of international legal education. He, who has been educated at Harvard in the prime of its new Socratic case method, also became in 1906 (until 1915) the first general editor of the American Casebook Series. J.B. Scott wrote in the preface to the first volume of the collection he had promoted, a strong argument in favour of the Harvard method. 112 His profession of faith in the case method continued unaltered throughout the years. In the updated edition of his own Cases on International Law (1922) released in the framework of the American Casebook series, Scott argued for the greater availability of foreign material in the following terms: 'it is devoutly to be wished that members of the profession in foreign countries (…) produce collections of cases, not only for the benefit of the profession to which they belong, but also for the purpose of instruction in the law schools, universities, and other seats of learning in their respective states'. 113 . The case method approach and the underpinnings of classical legal thought that accompanied it, found a cor- 
law as part of American domestic law, in his author's preface, Scott stressed that the idea underlying his Cases on International Law was 'that international law formed a part of the common law of England and that, as such, it passed to the United States with that law of which it formed a part'. 114 After serving as a technical delegate for the US government at the second Hague Conference, J.B. Scott will go on to publish his authoritative book The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 . In this work, Scott builds on the domestic judiciary analogy, and traces parallelisms between the Roman court system of justice, the development of the US federal judiciary system, and the progress of permanent bodies of international dispute settlement on the international stage. 115 By the outbreak of the First World War, in 1914, the US Bureau of Education published a report declaring the triumph of the new system of university legal education which put legal practice at its heart in the United States: 'today the case method forms the principal, if not the exclusive, method of teaching in nearly all of the stronger law schools of the country'. 116 Meanwhile, held in 1925, the Second Conference of Teachers of International Law reported that a study of 110 law school catalogues showed 65 carrying no course in international law, and 45 offering some kind of a course. This report added that 'a contemporaneous survey of the 61 schools then members of the Association of American Law Schools gave 31 as offering the subject and 30 not teaching it'. 117
The Spanish Ghosts of Harvard International Law Library
The second section has briefly examined the effects over the establishment of the ASIL of the role of international arbitration during the nineteenth century as well as the influence that the US domestic culture of legalistic rule and the early twentieth century liberal hope in the beneficial effects that the shaping of law and public policy had in promoting the development of international legal education in the United States at the height of the case method. (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) . Again, Dalmau requested of the Ministry a series of conditions relating to the preservation, extension and updating of the collection, the concession of a foreign diplomatic post, and the granting of another noble title. The pre-agreement drafted by the Marquis himself was contained in a letter addressed to José Canalejas, the President of the Spanish Council of Ministers (1910 Ministers ( -1912 . It was divided in two parts. The first part was entitled 'public agreement' and dealt with aspects related to the preservation, extension and updating of the library. The second part, or 'private agreement', which was to remain secret, elaborated in detail on the remainder of the conditions established by Dalmau. On the 31st July 1911, both parts of the contract were accepted by the Spanish government. However, on seeing that the agreement was not being implemented, Olivart addressed several letters to the Spanish Prime Minister, José Canalejas. The last of these containing an ultimatum was sent the evening before a final agreement between the agent commissioned by Harvard, Dr. Lichtenstein, and the Marquis was reached. In his correspondence to Canalejas, Dalmau stressed that Harvard's offer was becoming more 'pressing'. Canalejas answered that letter the very same later, this list contained in Article 38 was identified by H.L.A. Hart as the necessary 'rule of recognition' 140 which existence allowed international law to be considered 'law' against the Austinian challenge that had long bequeathed it with the label of 'positive international morality' 141 throughout the long nineteenth century.
After the Great War(s): Conclusion
The end of theFirst World War witnessed the emergence of a 'reconstructive doctrine' 142 in the field of international legal theory. The focus of this doctrine was the binding nature of international legal obligations and it was accompanied by the resurrection of natural law doctrines. The resurgence of natural law doctrines in the wake of the establishment of the League of Nations is consonant with the fact that the new supranational institutionalist faith of many interwar international lawyers required a revamped universalist aspiration. Indeed, during the post-war period in the European doctrine, the gradual restoration of natural law presented itself under different guises and it was often argued against the excesses of the earlier attraction of nationalism to interstate positivism. This re-conceptualised natural law orientation ranged from the solidaristic legal sociology of biological taints of Georges Scelle with his theory of 'dédoublement fonctionnel' 143 to the theories put forward by precursors of international human rights law such as Hersch Lauterpacht for whom 'the establishment and the binding force of international law as a whole' are both 'grounded in a factor superior to and independent of the will of states -a factor which gives validity to the law created by the will of the states. That superior rule is the objective fact of the existence of an interdependent community of states'. 144 In some quarters, such as in Spain, the cradle of Francisco de Vitoria, a neo-naturalist renewal allied itself with a neo-scholastic orientation 145 of quasi-national features that had begun to re-emerge alongside the first Spanish scientific generation of international lawyers in the last third of the nineteenth century. 146 This return to the Spanish classics would end up associated to a medievalist turn in international legal scholarship after the Spanish Civil War. 147 The very founder of the American Society of International Law, James Brown Scott, aware of the need to provide a moral foundation to the universal aspiration embodied by the League of Nations, and as representative of 'a turn to international institutions' which, as Koskenniemi 148 150 Catholic conservative prominent scholars, such as Le Fur in France, 151 also followed on the footsteps of a classic natural law tradition. Alfred Verdross' work would gradually depart from his earlier formal theoretical orientation to legal philosophy so as to put the universal Spanish tradition at the service of the axiological foundation of the international community and through the notion of an international constitution, at the service of binding character of international law. 152 In the aftermath of the Second World War, some of these interwar theoretical concepts would nurture the seeds of constitutional approaches to the international legal order among European international legal scholars in the wake of the UN Charter. 153 Meanwhile, the impact of sociological jurisprudence and, later, of legal realism on the tenets of 'classical legal thought' 154 led in the United States that had not joined the the League of Nations, to a different climate than the one prevailing in Europe during what has been defined as the 'foundational period of contemporary international law'. 155 The American pre-war doctrine shall be later decried together with the interwar years' dominant European reconstructive doctrine as part and parcel of a 'legalistic-moralistic approach to international relations' 156 by a post-Second World War influential retrospective realist interpretation that bitterly decried the 'apparently fantastic constructions of a legalism or idealism that had been oblivious to the "realities" of power in the international world'. 157 In the United States, this realist critique contributed to a 'new practical spirit, an orientation to process and policy at once contextual, purposive and functional' 158 which was diagnosed as a cure to the ailments and the abstractly idealised legalism of international law. It was also inspired by 'new philosophies of action' given to 'social engineering' that allowed what Roscoe Pound called 'the cosmological romance of some closed metaphysical system' 159 became now, very much in the image of the evolution of US domestic legal theory, the object of a functional critique of international law in terms of social ends. 160 The parallel course followed in the US is showed by the fact that the 'demand that orthodox international legal science transforms itself into a functional, result-oriented approach was in full sway by the time the World War II began'. 161 In fact, since the outbreak of the Second World War, this orientation would be marked in fire by the constitution pace E.H. Carr and H. Morgenthau's realist writings and of others, like G. Niemeyer, 162 of international relations as an academic field. 163 These teachings blended to give place to a 'post-war sensibility realism' that allied itself with the tional political science 176 where international law is portrayed as 'a primitive type of law primarily because it is almost completely decentralized'. 177 Morgenthau retraced his own intellectual tradition to theorists of 'power politics' through the likes of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes in 'a theory in Western political philosophy' against what he portrayed as 'the legalistmoralist approach to the conduct of international relations during the interwar period'. 178 After two World Wars, the failure of the League of Nations as an international security organisation to deliver international peace and security generated a hard-nosed realist critique of what became portrayed as an abstractly idealised legalism of international law in the interwar period. This realist critique has partially overshadowed the place in the genealogy of international law in the twentieth century of the generation who founded the American Society of International. Born out of the ashes, as we have seen, of the 1898 Spanish American War, and influenced by the US experience with the newly acquired overseas´ territories, 179 the pre-Wilsonian generation's role was that of instrumentally channeling the peripheral "imperial thrust" of an emerging great power by projecting a nuanced version of the peculiarities of the United States own domestic legal system and form of government to the international plane. Despite its historical coincidence, in the early twentieth century with the gradual reversion of long-standing dynamics of outer-European exclusion, 180 this generation would initially evolve against the background of what still remained, before the Great War, a barely institutionalised Western Eurocentric international legal system. One hundred years after the beginning of the First World War, one of the historiographical challenges before international lawyers is that of producing alternative historical narratives that can serve to identify and highlight alternative events in the history of international law. This can contribute to add a new breadth and texture to the historical background of the great historical caesurae in today's standard normative chronologies and periodisations of the field and, thus, contribute to a greater reflective understanding of the complex historical layers and multilayered intellectual sources that inform the continuities and discontinuities of interna- tional law as a discipline. 181 The centenary of the First World War provides us with a new occasion to reflect, with a greater benefit of hindsight, on the times and legacy of an almost forgotten generation of international lawyers, who like James Brown Scott believed that 'the stream is, indeed, everywhere colored by the soil through which it reaches the sea, but the sea itself is international'. 182 Our memory of this generation's ("instrumentally") legalistic and ("imperialistically") moralistic approach to international relations is what today one might be tempted to call the ambivalent shadow of the Pre-Wilsonian rise of international law.
